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—  Note  — 
The Growing Need for  
Third-Party Special Needs  
Trust Reform 
“The word ‘autism’ still conveys a fixed and dreadful meaning to 
most people—they visualize a child mute, rocking, screaming, 
inaccessible, cut off from human contact. And we almost always 
speak of autistic children, never of autistic adults, as if such 
children never grew up, or were somehow mysteriously spirited off 
the planet, out of society.” 
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* Oliver Sacks, Foreword to Temple Grandin, Thinking in Pictures 
and Other Reports from My Life with Autism xiii, xiii (2006). 
Oliver Sacks is a British-American writer and Professor of Neurology at 
New York University School of Medicine. Temple Grandin is an Animal 
Sciences Professor at Colorado State University, a best-selling author, and 
an autism activist who was diagnosed with autism at the age of two. 
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Introduction 
On July 8, 2011, emergency room nurses at a hospital in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, found a ten-year-old boy named Benjamin 
wandering around by himself in the hospital. After trying and failing 
to find his parents, they called the police. Security footage showed a 
man in a minivan dropping the boy off at the hospital and leaving. The 
subsequent investigation revealed that the boy’s mother had 
intentionally abandoned him. She said she was “overwhelmed.” She had 
just lost her job and gotten divorced. Her house was being foreclosed 
on, and she had two other children to care for. Even though she had 
“tried everything [she] could” to raise her son, she simply “could not 
handle” his behavioral and medical issues.1 
In any normal case, this woman’s actions would be appalling. But 
here, even the police seemed to be on her side. They had no intention 
of prosecuting her or Benjamin’s father. “They’re not bad parents,” the 
police department reported. “We’re talking about parents who tried 
everything else and got desperate . . . .”2 Why were the police so 
seemingly unconcerned about this case of child abandonment? The 
answer is simple: because Benjamin is autistic. The police turned the 
boy over to Florida’s Department of Children and Families so that he 
could be placed in a foster home with experience caring for children 
with special needs. 
In April 2013, a couple from Ottawa, Canada, made the “painful 
decision” to leave their son Philippé at a social services agency because 
they “could no longer handle him.”3 They said that their decision was 
“an act of desperation fuelled by 10 years of frustration.”4 Nonetheless, 
they felt comfortable giving up their child. “I am so sure about what 
we’re doing,”5 the father said. A camera crew accompanied the mother 
 
1. Wayne K. Roustan, Mother of Abandoned Boy with Autism “Overwhelmed,” 
Sun Sentinel (July 9, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-07-
09/news/fl-autistic-boy-court-20110709_1_autism-broward-judge-bad-
parents (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).  
2. Id. See also Susannah Bryan, Autistic Boy Left at Fort Lauderdale Hospital, 
Sun Sentinel (July 8, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-07-
08/news/fl-autistic-child-help-20110708_1_autistic-boy-severe-autism-
detective-travis-mandell (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (quoting Mark Riordan, 
spokesman for the Department of Children and Families, as saying occasions 
of parents abandoning children at hospitals are “very rare, practically 
unheard of”). 
3. Lesley Ciarula Taylor, Parents Leave Severely Autistic Son at Ottawa 
Social Services Agency in “Desperate Act,” The Star (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/05/01/autism_mothers_brutal
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as she arrived at the agency’s office to drop off her son. The agency 
fully supported the parents’ decision. Philippé—who is also autistic—
became one of 393 people with developmental disabilities waiting for a 
place in a group home in Ottawa.6 
Parents of disabled children face insurmountable hurdles when 
attempting what should be simple tasks. They may feel powerless to 
make their children eat, go to sleep, or even stop hurting themselves. 
In certain situations, the children require constant care and frequent, 
expensive medical attention. Some parents are overwhelmed by the 
continuous work and stress, and some in society accept their decisions 
to give their children up. Others sincerely want to keep caring for their 
children but require government assistance to do so. In the United 
States, the very systems designed to help these parents, Social Security 
and Medicaid, instead present a whole set of new legal problems. This 
is especially true for parents who want to leave money for the care of 
their special needs child after they are gone. One of the difficulties they 
face is creating a trust for a disabled child without the trust’s assets 
being considered “available” to the beneficiary and depriving him or 
her of Medicaid and Social Security benefits.  
Part I of this Note explains the origins and use of special needs 
trusts and differentiates between the three types: self-settled, pooled, 
and third-party special needs trusts. Part II addresses the requirements 
placed on these trusts by government benefit programs, including lack 
of beneficiary access, absolute trustee discretion, and limited use of 
funds. Part II also describes the challenges these restrictions create for 
attorneys and the additional issues presented by the adoption of the 
Uniform Trust Code. Part III describes the often conflicting interests 
of government assistance programs and the families of disabled 
children, and suggests that recent rises in the diagnosis rate of autism 
spectrum disorders makes the resolution of this conflict even more 
pressing. Finally, Part IV discusses why some proposed solutions would 
not solve the issues faced by third-party special needs trusts. It suggests 
that the best resolution would involve redrafting Social Security and 
Medicaid regulations to carve out new exceptions for third-party special 
needs trusts.  
I. Special Needs Trusts 
A. Definition 
Trusts are legal instruments under which assets are held in the 
trust’s name, managed by a trustee, and distributed for the benefit of 
 
6. Id. Charlotte Wilkinson, spokeswoman for the Ontario Ministry of 
Community and Social Services, added that placing one person like 
Philippé in a group home can cost “hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
The Growing Need for Third-Party Special Needs Trust Reform 
464 
a beneficiary.7 The beneficiary does not own the trust assets, but has 
an equitable right to derive benefits from them.8 Consequently, trusts 
are often used to shield assets from government scrutiny.9 Special needs 
trusts are a subset of trusts designed to allow a disabled beneficiary to 
maintain eligibility for public benefits that cover basic needs, while also 
receiving resources from his or her family that provide a higher quality 
of life.10 Special needs trusts must be established by a parent, 
grandparent, legal guardian, or court for the sole benefit of a disabled 
individual under the age of sixty-five.11 Because many disabled 
individuals cannot work, they have limited resources and are usually 
dependent upon their families, the government, or a combination of the 
two.12  
B. Legislative History 
In the past, due to the strict income-limiting eligibility standards 
of government assistance programs, families of disabled individuals 
were often unable to provide support for them without making them 
ineligible for public benefits. Instead, they would have to choose 
between retaining eligibility for public assistance, knowing that their 
loved one would receive only the essentials, or losing government aid 
and attempting to provide for the disabled individual entirely on their 
own. Alternatively, they could make the risky choice to disinherit the 
person and leave the money with another family member in the hopes 
 
7. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1546 (8th ed. 2004)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 
(2013).  
8. Id. 
9. Id.; see also Austin Wakeman Scott, Abridgment of the Law of 
Trusts 6 (1960) (explaining that trusts “were created for the very purpose 
of obtaining . . . flexibility and avoiding the application of the rules of law” 
and “[t]he trust has often served as a means of evading the law”). 
10. See Kemp C. Scales & Linda M. Anderson, Special Needs Trusts: 
Practical Tips for Avoiding Common Pitfalls, 74 Pa. B. Ass’n Q. 169, 
170 (2003); see also Amber K. Quintal, Planning for Individuals with 
Disabilities: Special Needs Trusts, The Practical Tax Law. 17, 17 
(2008) (stating that “Special needs trusts are means for persons with 
disabilities to qualify to receive government benefits from needs-based 
programs while having access to additional funds to pay for supplemental 
expenses not covered by the government benefits.”). 
11. ABCD Fact Sheet on Special Needs Trusts, Alliance for the 
Betterment of Citizens with Disabilities, http://www.abcdnj.org/ 
publications/medicaid/special-needs-trusts/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).  
12. Cf. id. (noting that, in New Jersey, a special needs trust “must be 
established by a parent, grandparent, or legal guardian . . . or a court”). 
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that he or she would use it for the disabled person’s benefit.13 Then, 
they discovered a third option: special needs trusts. Eventually, the 
creative use of these trusts to conceal money from Medicaid 
consideration became common practice.14  
Congress viewed these trusts as a form of Medicaid abuse and 
manipulation,15 calling them “the single most offensive Medicaid estate 
planning vehicle.”16 It attempted to limit the use of special needs trusts 
by promulgating a regulation that stated that all trust assets should be 
considered available to the beneficiary when determining Medicaid 
eligibility.17 Under pressure from disability rights activists, Congress 
repealed the law,18 but the problems with Medicaid manipulation by 
trusts persisted. State budgetary crises19 and an unanticipated and 
overwhelming increase in the number of Medicaid applicants 
exacerbated the problem.20  
In 1993 Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(“OBRA ’93”).21 Under OBRA ’93, Congress created a presumption of 
“availability” for trust funds; if someone received a personal injury or 
medical malpractice award and tried to protect that money by placing 
it in a special needs trust, the funds would be counted as “available” 
income for determining eligibility for government aid.22 Although 
OBRA ’93 effectively ended the ability of public benefits recipients to 
be trust beneficiaries, it appeased disability advocates by codifying two 
types of special needs trusts as exceptions to the rule: self-settled trusts 
 
13. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 171 (noting that leaving money to 
a sibling for a disabled child’s benefit is “an inherently risky option”).  
14. See Quintal, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that a common opportunity for 
using a special needs trust arises “when a person with significant assets 
becomes disabled and wants to qualify for needs-based government 
benefits without first spending down his or her own assets”).  
15. Ira Stewert Wiesner, OBRA ’93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust 
Availability, and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 Nova 
L. Rev. 679, 682–83 (1995).  
16. Id. at 703. 
17. Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 958–59 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that Congress’s regulation was a “condemnation” of the technique of 
sheltering or shielding assets in an irrevocable trust). 
18. Id. at 959. 
19. Wiesner, supra note 15, at 683.  
20. Id. at 734 (“State Medicaid agencies faced more clients seeking assistance 
. . . than they had anticipated or were capable of serving.”). 
21. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 
312 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2012)).  
22. Jennifer Field, Special Needs Trusts: Providing for Disabled Children 
Without Sacrificing Public Benefits, 24 J. Juv. L. 79, 86 (2003). 
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and pooled trusts.23 Through these special needs trusts, relatives of the 
disabled beneficiary could now supplement basic needs with simple 
comforts without risking the loss of government assistance.24 Congress 
believed it had finally found a solution that could please everyone. 
1. Self-Settled Special Needs Trusts 
The first exception to the “available” trust funds presumption is 
self-settled trusts, also called (d)(4)(A) trusts because they are defined 
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A).25 Self-settled trusts must be funded with 
the assets of a disabled individual under the age of sixty-five. To be 
considered “disabled,” the individual “must be unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death 
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 
of not less than twelve months.”26 The trust must also be established 
by someone other than the disabled individual, such as a parent, 
grandparent, or legal guardian, for the sole benefit of the disabled 
individual.27 Finally, it must contain a “payback” provision, stating 
that all funds left in the trust after the disabled beneficiary dies will be 
used to repay the state Medicaid agency for the assistance it provided.28 
2. Pooled Special Needs Trusts 
The second exception is the pooled, or (d)(4)(C), trust.29 Pooled 
trusts are managed by nonprofit associations, which maintain separate 
accounts for each disabled beneficiary but pool the funds for investment 
purposes.30 Unlike regular self-settled trusts, pooled trusts can be 
established by the disabled beneficiary him or herself, or by a parent, 
 
23. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 171. 
24. See Jennifer Brannan, Third-Party Special Needs Trust: Dead or Alive in 
a Uniform Trust Code World, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 249, 250–51 
(2010); see also Patricia Tobin, 20/20 Foresight: Planning Ahead for 
Special Needs Trusts, 11 Prob. & Prop. 56, 56 (1997) (stating that 
“[s]pecial needs trusts typically are used so that the beneficiary will have 
a reserve fund and still qualify for financial means tested public benefits”). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A)(2012). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2012). See also Quintal, supra note 10, at 19 
(discussing the requirements of (d)(4)(A) trusts). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (“[T]he State will receive all amounts 
remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount 
equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual under 
a State plan under this subchapter.”); see also Scales & Anderson, supra 
note 10, at 171 (discussing the payback requirement). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) (2012). 
29. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 172. 
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grandparent, or legal guardian.31 Lastly, the trust must contain a 
provision stating that when the beneficiary dies, the remaining funds 
in the account will either be distributed to other members of the pooled 
trust or used to pay back state Medicaid agencies.32 Pooled trusts are 
most commonly used when the family of the disabled individual cannot 
choose a trustee or afford to hire a professional trustee. A family that 
prefers to see the funds go to other disabled people rather than the 
state may also choose a pooled trust.33 
3. Third-Party Special Needs Trusts 
OBRA ’93 failed to create an exception for third-party special needs 
trusts. These trusts differ from self-settled and pooled trusts in that 
they are funded with the assets of someone other than the disabled 
beneficiary.34 Because the beneficiary of a third-party trust never owned 
the assets prior to the creation of the trust, OBRA ’93 does not apply 
at all. Third-party trusts are usually established by a parent, 
grandparent, or legal guardian of a disabled individual. They can be 
either inter vivos trusts established during the grantor’s life or 
testamentary trusts created through a will.35 Inter vivos trusts allow 
the parents or grandparents of a disabled child to put funds into the 
trust and ensure that the trust functions properly before they die.36 
Third-party trusts are also exempt from the payback requirements of 
self-settled and pooled trusts, which means the grantor can designate 
 
30. Brannan, supra note 24, at 252. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv) (“To the extent that amounts remaining 
in the beneficiary’s account upon the death of the beneficiary are not 
retained by the trust, the trust pays to the State from such remaining 
amounts in the account an amount equal to the total amount of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan under 
this subchapter.”). This payback provision is slightly different from the 
one in (d)(4)(A) because the remaining trust funds may be distributed to 
other beneficiaries of the pooled trust instead of the state. 
32. Brannan, supra note 24, at 252 (“A Pooled trust would most likely be 
created when the family . . . prefers that the amount remaining in the 
trust after the beneficiary’s death be passed to disabled individuals rather 
than be given back to the state.”).  
33. Id. Self-settled and pooled trusts can be funded with damages awarded to 
the beneficiary through personal injury or medical malpractice suits. See 
id. at 251–52. Third-party special needs trusts are typically funded by 
family members. The significant difference is that beneficiaries of third-
party special needs trusts are more likely to have been born with their 
disability. 
34. E.g., id. at 252. 
35. Brannan, supra note 24, at 253.  
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that the funds should pass to remainder beneficiaries, such as the 
disabled individual’s siblings, after the disabled beneficiary dies.37  
The lack of payback requirements for third-party special needs 
trusts takes some pressure off of parents who have both disabled and 
non-disabled children. Instead of trying to estimate their disabled 
child’s lifespan to decide how much money to place in the trust, the 
grantors know that their other children will ultimately receive any 
remaining money left in the trust. While third-party special needs trusts 
may, at first glance, appear to be more flexible than self-settled trusts, 
they suffer from many complexities in drafting and administration that 
make maintaining eligibility for government assistance difficult.  
II. The Problem of Maintaining Medicaid Eligibility 
For disabled individuals, the two most important government 
benefits are Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Medicaid.38 In 
response to concern over the rising costs of health care,39 Congress 
created Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965.40 
Medicaid is a jointly funded state and federal program that provides 
medical assistance to people who could not otherwise afford medical 
care.41 The program is now the nation’s largest health insurer, with a 
combined federal-state cost of $400 billion annually.42 The cost is 
expected to increase even more with the implementation of Affordable 
 
36. E.g., Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 171. For many trust grantors 
and their relatives who may qualify for self-settled or pooled trusts, third-
party special needs trusts are attractive options precisely because they do 
not include a payback provision.  
37. Tobin, supra note 24, at 56.  
38. Mary F. Radford & Clarissa Bryan, Irrevocability of Special Needs Trusts: 
The Tangled Web That Is Woven When English Feudal Law Is Imported 
into Modern Determinations of Medicaid Eligibility, 8 Nat’l Acad. 
Elder L. Att’ys J. 1, 5 (2012). 
39. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 
(1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012)).  
40. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (“The Medicaid program was 
created in 1965, when Congress added Title XIX to the Social Security 
Act . . . for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States 
that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy 
persons.”). 
41. Jeffrey R. Grimyser, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Why Supplemental 
Needs Trusts Should Be Exempt from Medicaid Determinations, 89 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 438, 442 (2014) (citing John D. Blum & Gayland O. 
Hethcoat II, Medicaid Governance in the Wake of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius: Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, 
from Administrative Law to State Compacts, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 
601, 610 (2012)). 
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Care Act expansions.43 SSI is a federal program that pays for basic 
living expenses of disabled individuals, such as food, clothing, and 
shelter.44 The eligibility rules for SSI are similar across the nation, and 
in most states, SSI is linked to Medicaid so that a recipient of one 
qualifies for the other.45 Both SSI and Medicaid are “needs-based” or 
“means-tested” public benefit programs meant for low-income 
individuals, so incomes and resources below a specified level are 
necessary in order to qualify.46 Generally, a person loses eligibility for 
SSI and Medicaid if he possesses more than $2,000 in countable assets. 
He would have to spend down those assets in order to requalify.47  
To determine eligibility, SSI breaks income down into three 
categories: earned, unearned, and in-kind.48 While most disabled 
individuals do not have earned income, distributions from trusts may 
be counted as unearned income if they are not made in the correct 
way.49 Also, if someone buys food or rents an apartment for the disabled 
individual, it would be considered in-kind income and could make the 
disabled beneficiary ineligible for government assistance.50 Money 
received in the current month is “income,” and any money left over on 
the first day of the next month is an “asset.”51 Some assets, including 
the beneficiary’s home, one vehicle, furniture, life insurance, and 
personal items, are not considered “countable” for eligibility purposes.52 
But improper trust distributions run the risk of being counted as income 
and disqualifying the disabled beneficiary for SSI and Medicaid 
eligibility. For example, if the trust paid for basic repairs to the 
beneficiary’s only home or vehicle, the value of those repairs would be 
 
42. Id. at 442 n.18. 
43. See Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 170. 
44. Tobin, supra note 24, at 56. 
45. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 170; see also Univ. of Wash. Med. 
Ctr. v. Sebelius, 634 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
Medicaid eligibility rules require that a person have “income and resources 
[that] are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services”). 
46. Disability Rights Washington, Special Needs Trusts 1 (2007) 
(available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/special-needs-trusts-0) 
[hereinafter Disability Rights]; see also Quintal, supra note 10, at 18 
(noting the distinction between countable and noncountable assets).  
47. Brannan, supra note 24, at 254. 
48. See id. at 254–55. 
49. Id. at 254; Understanding Supplemental Security Income: SSI Income, 
Social Security, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi. 
htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
50. Micah Huff & Martha Brown, Special-Needs Trusts: Drafting and 
Administration Issues, 56 St. Louis B. J. 10, 13 (2010). 
51. Id.  
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considered income because they would normally be covered by SSI. 
Third-party special needs trusts are highly susceptible to this danger. 
Because they are not listed as exceptions to OBRA ’93, third-party 
special needs trusts depend on courts’ interpretations of trust language 
to decide whether the trust is a support trust or a supplemental trust. 
Beneficiaries of supplemental trusts are eligible for Medicaid, but 
beneficiaries of support trusts are not. As a result, grantors and drafters 
of special needs trusts have to carefully consider the factors courts will 
access in defining the trust: the (1) beneficiary’s access to the funds; 
(2) level of trustee discretion; and (3) use of the funds. 
A. Beneficiary Access 
Countable assets for determining SSI and Medicaid eligibility 
include only assets that are considered “available” to the disabled 
beneficiary.53 Thus, the key to a successful special needs trust is keeping 
the funds unavailable. Funds are “available” “[i]f the individual has the 
right, authority or power to liquidate the property or his or her share 
of the property.”54 To ensure trust assets are considered unavailable, 
the disabled beneficiary must have no control over the trust, including 
the power to remove or replace trustees or compel distributions.55 
Discretionary trusts accomplish this by using permissive language to 
describe distributions: “may” instead of “shall.”56 This language creates 
a “mere expectancy” of a distribution, giving the beneficiary no 
enforceable property rights in the trust.57 Because the beneficiary 
cannot bring claims against a trustee who refuses to distribute trust 
funds, he or she has no property right in the trust, and the trust assets 
are considered unavailable for government assistance purposes.58 The 
Social Security Administration also suggests making the trust 
irrevocable because that prevents the beneficiary from terminating the 
trust and gaining access to the funds.59 In order to function, third-party 
special needs trusts must take control over the trusts funds away from 
the beneficiary and give it instead to the trustee; however, this creates 
a new problem—the potential for abuse.60 
 
52. Quintal, supra note 10, at 18.  
53. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a)(1) (2014).  
54. Quintal, supra note 10, at 23. 
55. Brannan, supra note 24, at 263. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 263–64. 
58. Field, supra note 22, at 82. 
59.  World Institute on Disability, Special Needs Trusts: Problems and 
Solutions, Equity E-Newsletter (Apr. 2006), http://wid.org/center-
on-economic-growth/programs-of-the-center-on-economic-growth/access-
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B. Trustee Has Absolute Discretion 
1. Trustee Power and Duties 
Creators of a special needs trust have to select a trustee to manage 
the investment and distribution of trust funds. The trustee should use 
the funds to pay the expenses of the disabled beneficiary but should 
never give him or her funds directly.61 Normally, the trustee assumes a 
“fiduciary duty” to act in the best interest of the person with disabilities 
and can be sued for violating this duty.62 But in the case of a third-
party special needs trust, where a key element is the inability of the 
beneficiary to demand distribution, winning a case against the trustee 
for breach of fiduciary duty could result in the loss of government 
benefits. 
Special needs trusts often sacrifice the beneficiary’s legal protection 
by giving the trustee full or “absolute” discretion over the timing, 
purpose, and amount of distributions.63 This type of discretion is 
broader than usually found in trusts.64 Under this standard, the trustee 
can deny any request from the beneficiary, even if it is entirely 
reasonable and essentially has the ability never to make a single 
distribution.65 Courts usually refuse to intervene when the trustee has 
absolute discretion.66 Furthermore, it is hard to prove that the trustee 
does not have a good motive for withholding distributions. As a result, 
if there is any plausible reason for the trustee’s actions, he will win the 
case and not be required to distribute any trust funds.67 The creation 
of checks and balances within the trust documents can help prevent 




60. Disability Rights, supra note 46, at 2.  
61. Id.  
62. Stephen W. Dale, Choosing the Ideal Trustee of Your Child’s Special 
Needs Trust, The Special Needs Alliance, 1, 1 http://www.wrights 
law.com/info/ideal.trustee.dale.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).  
63. Lisa Nachmias Davis, Absolute Discretion: Understanding the Trustee 
Provisions in Your Child’s Special Needs Trust, EP Mag., June 2008, at 
52. 
64. Dale, supra note 62, at 1 (“When parents create a Special Needs Trust 
for their son or daughter, they are creating a contract that is empowering 
the trustee with the ability to never make a single distribution if the 
trustee so desires.”); see also Davis, supra note 63, at 52 (“A Special Needs 
Trust gives the Trustee enormous power to help—or not help—your child. 
The Trustee has absolute discretion.”).  
65. Davis, supra note 63, at 52. 
66. Id.  
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that even well-intentioned human error can completely deprive a 
beneficiary of public benefits.68 
2. Choice of Trustee 
Because the trustee will have absolute discretion over the special 
needs trust, the choice of trustee is extremely important. For grantors 
with special needs children, choosing a trustee can be extremely 
difficult. The most common and convenient choice for trustee is a 
responsible family member or close friend who is acquainted with and 
cares about the beneficiary.69 Unfortunately, many trusts fail because 
the family member who was well intentioned and willing to become 
trustee was ill equipped to handle the associated responsibilities.70 Some 
may even change their mind about accepting the position after 
discovering what fiduciary duties and recording requirements are placed 
upon trustees.71 This is especially true for special needs trusts because 
of the added complexities. If a family member trustee accepts the 
position initially and then decides to give it up, finding a replacement 
becomes even more difficult.72 Also, even if a trustee is willing and able 
to handle the responsibility, her relationship with the disabled 
beneficiary can cloud her judgment. Circumstances and emotions may 
pressure a trustee to make distributions for the immediate well-being 
or happiness of the disabled individual that will ultimately result in loss 
of government benefits.  
On the other hand, banks or private professional trustees like 
lawyers or accountants tend to be very knowledgeable and responsible 
and usually outperform family members as trustees.73 They have 
experience performing the investment, management, accounting, and 
tax services required of a trustee.74 But they may not be an option for 
some families because they charge an annual fee, often 1 percent of the 
value of the trust.75 They may also require a minimum trust fund 
 
67. Id. at 53.  
68. Brannan, supra note 24, at 257. 
69. Dale, supra note 62, at 2. 
70. Tobin, supra note 24, at 60. 
71. Id. 
72. Dale, supra note 62, at 3. 
73. Field, supra note 22, at 83. 
74. Id. at 84. 
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amount of $250,000 to $500,000,76 whereas assets in special needs trusts 
commonly range from only $10,000 to $150,000.77  
Professional trustees also lack the personal touch that many 
families desire in a trustee. They do not have a relationship with the 
beneficiary or knowledge of his or her needs and preferences.78 
Depending on the nature of the beneficiary’s disability, he or she may 
have very specific or unique needs, or may be completely self-sufficient 
in some areas and totally helpless in others. Without knowledge of these 
details, the trustee may make some completely unnecessary 
distributions while neglecting to cover other important needs.  
The choice of trustee is one of the most important elements of a 
successful special needs trust. Because of the atypical situations they 
are put in, trustees of special needs trusts must be both compassionate 
and vigilant. Consequently, attorneys who fail to advise the grantor 
about the inherent dangers of choosing the wrong trustee are often 
liable for malpractice.79  
C. Use of Funds 
Any distribution from a special needs trust made directly to the 
disabled beneficiary or spent on support rather than supplemental 
benefits could make the beneficiary ineligible for need-based govern-
ment benefits.80 While attorneys are responsible for drafting a trust with 
appropriate distribution standards to prevent loss of eligibility, trustees 
must also be prepared to carefully consider the consequences of each 
distribution they make.81 Special needs trusts may be classified as either 
supplemental trusts (often called “discretionary trusts”) or support 
trusts, depending on the kind of expenses for which the trust funds are 
used. Support trust assets can be used to pay for the beneficiary’s food, 
clothing, and shelter.82 Conversely, supplemental trusts are used only 
 
75. Brannan, supra note 24, at 257; Field, supra note 22, at 84. 
76. Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with 
Disabilities: The Development of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, 
10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 91, 97 n.27 (2000).  
77. Brannan, supra note 24, at 257. 
78. Disability Rights, supra note 46, at 2. 
79. Quintal, supra note 10, at 22. 
80. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 176 (“With even the best-drafted 
trusts, problems almost inevitably arise in their administration, especially 
by trustees unfamiliar with the way various government agencies view 
‘income.’ Improper administration can result in the loss of public benefits 
to the beneficiary and therefore liability to the trustee, and the attorney 
advising the trustee. Once the special needs trust has been drafted and 
funded, it is important that the attorney provide explicit guidance to the 
trustee regarding administration of the trust.”). 
81. Field, supra note 22, at 81. 
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to provide for the beneficiary’s needs not already covered by public 
benefits.83 Such needs are often called “luxuries,” but they simply allow 
the disabled beneficiary to maintain a standard of life above basic 
survival,84 since public benefits like SSI and Medicaid are designed to 
provide only the “bare necessities.”85  
For example, the SSI definition of “food and shelter” covers 
payments for “food, mortgage . . . , real property taxes, rent, heating 
fuel, gas, electricity, water, sewer, and garbage removal.”86 If the trust 
attempts to pay any of these expenses on the beneficiary’s behalf, it 
will jeopardize SSI eligibility. Supplemental trusts should provide other 
goods and services important for daily life: help with shopping and 
errands, transportation, vacations, entertainment, computer equip-
ment, toiletries, personal hygiene assistance, and companionship.87 The 
trusts can also provide medical care beyond what Medicaid covers, such 
as over-the-counter medication, experimental treatments, private 
nurses, and rehabilitation services.88 
Another issue for third-party special needs trusts is that there are 
no clear rules on what qualifies as a supplemental trust versus a support 
trust. Courts ultimately decide whether a disputed trust is 
supplemental or supportive. The best way to ensure that a trust is 
supplemental is to include a limiting distribution standard in the trust 
instrument. This language cannot generally force the trustee to make 
distributions, but it can prohibit him or her from distributing funds for 
certain purposes. SSI and Medicaid regulations do not recognize a 
specific standard, but some states do.89 Ohio, for example, requires a 
supplemental trust to contain a strict distribution standard that 
explicitly prohibits payments for food, clothing, and shelter.90 While 
broad trust language like “health, maintenance, education, and 
 
82. Id.  
83. Id.; see also Tobin, supra note 24, at 56–58 (“[D]isabled individuals . . . 
may need services or goods that could be considered luxuries for those in 
good health but are necessities for impaired individuals.”). 
84. Field, supra note 22, at 81.  
85. Huff & Brown, supra note 50, at 14.  
86. Id. at 14–15; see also Tobin, supra note 24, at 58 (listing “necessary 
luxuries” that a supplemental trust may provide).  
87. Tobin, supra note 24, at 56. 
88. Field, supra note 22, at 82–83.  
89. Id. at 83; see also Quintal, supra note 10, at 22 (“[M]any practitioners 
. . . expressly prohibit distributions for basic needs such as food, clothing, 
and shelter.”); Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 174–75 (“An 
alternative distribution standard is the strict “SSI standard” prohibiting 
any distributions for food, clothing, or shelter . . . . While this is the safest 
and most conservative standard for a special needs trust, it is also the 
most inflexible.”).  
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support” is common and provides more flexibility, it may put the trust 
in danger of being considered a support trust and causing the 
beneficiary to lose eligibility for SSI and Medicaid.91 On the other hand, 
a rigid standard will also prevent the trustee from making payments 
that would temporarily reduce the beneficiary’s benefits but would 
benefit the disabled individual overall.92  
The trust document can also spell out that the grantor’s intent was 
to “supplement and not supplant” public benefits.93 The benefit of this 
“intent clause” is illustrated in four cases reviewed by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court between 1987 and 1996.94 All four cases involved trusts 
with similar distributions standards. In two of the cases, the court 
decided that the trust assets were protected by inferring the trust 
settlor’s intent to create a supplemental trust from the trust language 
and the circumstances surrounding its creation.95 In Lang v. 
Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare,96 the trust document 
instructed the trustee to support the beneficiary only to the extent not 
already covered by public assistance and to invest the remainder.97 The 
court held that this showed that the testator’s intent was to “set up a 
discretionary support trust rather than a mandatory form of trust or a 
‘pure’ support trust.”98 In Snyder v. Commonwealth, Department of 
Public Welfare,99 the court held that the grantor intended to only 
supplement her son’s needs because she explicitly instructed the trustee 
not to support her son if it would result in the loss of aid.100 
In the other two cases, the court decided that the trust assets were 
not protected. The court in Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare101 held that a trust was 
clearly meant for support when it mandated the trustee to make 
 
90. Quintal, supra note 10, at 23; see also Huff & Brown, supra note 50, at 
14 (“Some attorneys that draft SNTs mistakenly believe that the 
ascertainable standards of ‘health, education, maintenance, and support’ 
are necessary, or that the standards should be inserted for good measure. 
This is an incorrect assumption, and usually, a costly mistake that can 
harm a beneficiary on public benefits.”). 
91. Quintal, supra note 10, at 23. 
92. Huff & Brown, supra note 50, at 13. 
93. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 174. 
94. Id. 
95. 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987).  
96. Id. at 1345. 
97. Id. at 1343.  
98. 598 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1991). 
99. Id. at 1287. 
100. 598 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 1991). 
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quarterly payments to the beneficiary, regardless of her other sources 
of assistance.102 Also, in Estate of Rosenberg v. Department of Public 
Welfare,103 the court held that the grantor of a spousal support trust 
whose wife had never needed public assistance could not have intended 
for the trust to become supplemental at some future time.104 To 
summarize, when the grantor knows that the beneficiary would be 
eligible for government assistance and intends the trust funds to only 
supplement other aid, the trust is supplemental. If not, the court will 
likely classify the trust as a support trust and disqualify the beneficiary 
from receiving Medicaid benefits.105 
As a general guideline, trustees of special needs trust should never 
distribute cash directly to the beneficiary because it will reduce the 
beneficiary’s SSI benefit dollar-for-dollar.106 The trust and family 
members of the beneficiary may choose to make in-kind distributions 
of food or clothing to the beneficiary. Under SSI rules, these will reduce 
the disabled individual’s benefits, but the amount of the reduction is 
capped.107 If planned correctly, large in-kind distributions of food or 
clothing will outweigh the loss of SSI benefits and have a net positive 
impact. The trustee can also get around SSI and Medicaid regulations 
through creative distributions that are not quite support.108 For 
example, the trust cannot purchase medical services, but it could hire 
domestic caregivers or personal assistants.109 It cannot pay rent, but it 
can fund renovations to the beneficiary’s home for accessibility.110 
Finally, the trust could pay for the professional services of lawyers and 
accountants.111 
 
101. Id. at 1282. 
102. 679 A.2d 767 (Pa. 1996). 
103. Id. at 772. 
104. Rosenberg, supra note 76, at 120 (“[A] trust that clearly expresses the 
creator’s intent to supplement and not to replace government benefits will 
not be considered an available resource” but “[a]mbiguous language gives 
a court the opportunity to utilize its own concept of public policy or 
fairness to achieve a certain result.”). 
105. Scales & Anderson, supra note 10, at 176. 
106. Id. at 177. 
107. Id. at 176; see also Brannan, supra note 24, at 255–56 (discussing 
alternative expenditures, like caregiver services or attorney’s fees).  
108. Brannan, supra note 24, at 255. As another example, the trust could pay 
for a wheelchair accessible van and its maintenance, repair, and insurance 
costs. Id. 
109. Id. at 255–56.  
110. Id. at 256. The trust funds could also be used to pay for “luxuries” that 
would benefit the disabled child emotionally, mentally, or socially. 
Recreation, vacations, education, and training would all be included. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
The Growing Need for Third-Party Special Needs Trust Reform 
477 
D. Effects of the Uniform Trust Code 
The Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) was drafted using the trust 
statutes of several different states along with the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts.112 It attempted to codify trust law as a response to the 
increased use of trusts in estate planning and growing awareness of lack 
of substantial state trust laws.113 In 2000, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UTC.114 It serves 
mostly as a default statute to be applied when the trust document is 
silent, and it can be largely overridden by language in trust 
instruments.115 In the case of third-party special needs trusts, the terms 
of the UTC that cannot be overridden, such as the duty of the trustee 
to act in good faith, create problems.116 Despite its attempt to make 
trust creation easier, the UTC may hurt third-party special needs trusts 
more than it helps.117 As a result, fewer than half of the states have 
adopted the UTC, and many of these applied substantial revisions.118 
Critics of the UTC point to two main problems it presents for third-
party special needs trusts: (1) the “good faith” requirement for trustees, 
and (2) the elimination of the distinction between discretionary and 
support trusts.119 The “good faith” requirement implemented by the 
UTC in section 804(a) states that the trust beneficiary may demand 
distribution if the trustee abuses power.120 But if the beneficiary of a 
special needs trust took advantage of this ability, the trust assets would 
be reclassified as “available” income to the beneficiary, leading to loss 
of Medicaid benefits.121  
The second problem with the UTC is the reversal of 
long-established common law distinctions between discretionary and 
 
111. Id. at 261. Drafters of the UTC also had to consider and cooperate with 
the Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers, and the Restatement of Restitution. They spent seven years on 
the final version. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id.  
114. Id. at 262. 
115. Id.  
116. Id.  
117. For example, when Ohio adopted the UTC, it modified exceptions to 
spendthrift provisions that make it more difficult for creditors to access 
trust funds left to spouses and children. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 5805.02(C), 5805.03, 5805.04(D) (West 2007) (modifying UTC §§ 503–
04).  
118. Brannan, supra note 24, at 263. 
119. Id. at 265–66.  
120. Id. at 264–65.  
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support trusts.122 If a trust that is used only for supplemental purposes 
is now treated the same as one used for support, then the standard for 
distributions that end eligibility for SSI and Medicaid regulations may 
become blurred. Previously acceptable distributions may now be 
considered countable “support” to the beneficiary and make the 
beneficiary ineligible for needs-based government aid.123 As a result, 
attorneys drafting special needs trusts are forced to explicitly waive 
parts of the UTC that would otherwise afford clients protection against 
abuse. Thus, in its attempts to reform and simplify trust creation, the 
UTC actually further complicated the trust creation and management 
processes for families with disabled children.  
III. Policy 
At first glance it may seem that the government and Medicaid 
beneficiaries have opposing interests when it comes to trusts. Benefici-
aries presumably want to conceal their assets in trusts while taking 
advantage of government programs, while the government wants to 
avoid giving out unnecessary aid. But, upon closer inspection, it 
becomes clear that many disabled individuals cannot maintain an 
adequate quality of life without relying on both government aid and 
trust funds. This is especially true of beneficiaries of third-party special 
needs trusts. Medicaid and SSI are designed only to help maintain a 
basic standard of health and quality of life for those who cannot entirely 
afford their own support—a situation in which many parents with 
disabled children inevitably find themselves. 
A. Government Versus Family Interests 
The government has obvious interests in protecting its programs 
from abuse, so concern about overreliance on Medicaid and Social 
Security comes as no surprise. The initial distrust of special needs trusts 
in particular was based on the belief that people who were disabled but 
still wealthy could draw on government funds they did not need instead 
of spending their own money.124 There was also fear that expanding 
public assistance would lessen the incentive for communities to create 
informal support networks and create even more reliance on the 
government.125 When Congress passed OBRA ’93, it achieved its goal  
121. Id. at 265 (stating that discretionary and support trusts have been treated 
differently under common law for more than 125 years).  
122. Id.  
123. Rosenberg, supra note 76, at 145 (“The obvious critique of SNTs is that 
they allow people with private resources to utilize the SSI and Medicaid 
programs at the expense of people who are truly indigent.”).  
124. Id. at 144 (quoting Bruce C. Vladek et al., Confronting the Ambivalence 
of Disability Policy: Has Push Come to Shove?, in Disability: 
Challenges for Social Insurance, Health Care Financing & 
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of limiting trust beneficiaries’ access to government aid and mitigated 
some of these fears. However, by failing to include third-party special 
needs trusts as an exception to the rule, Congress created unreasonable 
restrictions that do more harm than good, particularly to third-party 
special needs trusts. 
As previously discussed, self-settled special needs trusts are usually 
funded with damages from personal injury or medical malpractice suits. 
Money is awarded to a plaintiff for the purpose of paying the plaintiff’s 
medical expenses but then is set aside in a trust so that it can be used 
for other things. The plaintiff can then rely on government aid for basic 
needs and medical care, even when he should be able to cover those 
costs himself. Conversely, third-party special needs trusts are funded 
primarily by family members of the beneficiary. The money going into 
the trust is not specially designated for medical care, and it never 
belonged to the beneficiary.  
The beneficiaries of third-party special needs trusts are often 
disabled children who will always be dependent on someone else for 
their care due to their severe physical or mental disabilities.126 If they 
qualify for Medicaid, gifts or inheritances could disqualify them. 
Without third-party special needs trusts, they have no way of 
supplementing their income. Government aid provides them with a low 
quality of life, limited to the bare necessities. Families who cannot 
afford to fully support the child must become reliant on Medicaid 
coverage, even if it means depriving their child of certain comforts to 
maintain eligibility.127 Third-party special needs trusts are not meant 
to needlessly drain resources from government programs. Rather, their 
purpose is to “mitigate[] the inadequacies of government benefit 
programs” by covering non-medical needs of disabled dependents.128 
The government also faces public interest and health problems 
associated with the limited resources of Medicaid. Many disabled 
individuals get their health insurance through Medicaid, but the focus 
of the program on health care neglects other areas of life in which 
disabled individuals need extra assistance.129 For example, Medicaid 
does not provide “adequate mental health services, community based 
 
Labor Market Policy 83, 87–88 (Virginia P. Reno et al. eds., 1997) 
(stating that proposals to expand government program eligibility or 
services are often met with concern that “additional people will emerge 
‘out of the woodwork’ to take advantage of the services”).  
125. Id. at 109. 
126. Grimyser, supra note 42, at 467 (explaining how third-party special needs 
trust grantors face “a catch-22: either receive Medicaid and be prohibited 
from using SNTs; or use a SNT and [risk] becom[ing] ineligible for 
Medicaid”).  
127. Rosenberg, supra note 76, at 94. 
128. Id. at 147. 
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services, or access to assistive technology.”130 Allowing special needs 
trusts to supplement Medicaid may allow the beneficiary to live more 
independently or become more involved with family and the com-
munity. The ability to take advantage of these other resources could 
reduce costly hospital or institutional care.131  
Overall, the possible benefits of letting families supplement 
Medicaid and SSI without losing the benefits entirely are unexplored 
because the regulations have always been focused on cutting off aid to 
anyone who might drain the system. A change in policy and perspective 
could help government aid programs save money while also improving 
the benefits that their recipients experience. 
B. Scientific Evidence of Rise in Diagnosis  
of Autism-Spectrum Disorders 
Government assistance programs now face the growing challenge of 
providing for young, mentally disabled individuals. Many of these 
children have been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”), 
which includes autism and Asperger disorders.132 Diagnosing children 
with ASD is complex and time consuming because it is based on “com-
prehensive behavioral evaluations.”133 There is no medical detection 
system.134 Instead, children must be evaluated for “impairments in 
social interaction and communication along with restricted, repetitive, 
and stereotyped patterns of behaviors, interests, and activities.”135 
Scientific studies suggest that the diagnosis rate of ASD and other 
mental disorders in children is increasing.136 The Center for Autism 
reports that autism now affects one in sixty-eight children.137 In 
addition, autism is the fastest-growing serious developmental disability 
 
129. Id.  
130. Id. 
131. Stephen J. Blumberg et al., Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Changes in Prevalence of Parent-Reported Autism Spectrum Disorders in 
School-Aged Children: 2007 to 2011–2012, 65 Nat’l Health Stat. Rep. 
1 (2013). 
132. Id. 
133. Autism Fact Sheet, Center for Autism, http://www.thecenterfor 
autism.org/news/autism-fact-sheet (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) [hereinafter 
Fact Sheet]. 
134. Blumberg, supra note 131, at 1. 
135. See Lorna Wing & David Potter, The Epidemiology of Autism Spectrum 
Disorders: Is the Prevalence Rising?, 8 MENTAL RETARDATION & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REV. 151, 151 (2002); see also Blum-
berg, supra note 131, at 1 (noting “a significant increase” in parent-
reported autism). 
136. Fact Sheet, supra note 133. 
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in the United States.138 For example, the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (“CDC”) recently reported that the rate of ASD in 
children between the ages of six and seventeen rose from 1.16 percent 
in 2007 to 2 percent in 2011–2012.139 It is unclear whether the increase 
is due to a rising occurrence rate or more awareness and better diagnosis 
methods. 
Currently, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends a 
developmental screening of all children for ASD by the age of 
twenty-four months.140 Still, many children go undiagnosed until they 
reach school age, when their parents and teachers are more likely to 
notice their unusual difficulty in making friends or inability to interact 
normally with other children.141 In addition, diagnosis becomes more 
common once children reach school age because children must have a 
named disability to qualify for special education under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Act.142 Many experts believe that the increase in the 
rate of diagnosis can be attributed to greater public knowledge about 
ASD and its symptoms.  
The CDC’s data support the idea that the number of diagnoses of 
ASD is rising but not the actual occurrence rate. Its recent phone 
survey revealed that 30 percent of children between ages ten and 
thirteen and 14 percent of children between ages fourteen and seventeen 
were first diagnosed at age seven or older.143 At that point, they were 
well past the age when symptoms of their ASD would have been 
noticeable. Furthermore, more than half of the same children had only 
“mild” ASD. According to the CDC: 
Together, these findings suggest that the increase in prevalence 
of parent-reported ASD may have resulted from improved 
ascertainment of ASD by doctors and other health care 
professionals in recent years, especially when the symptoms are 
 
137. Id.  
138. Blumberg, supra note 131, at 2. These data were taken from the 2007 and 
2011–2012 versions of the National Survey of Children’s Health—a 
telephone survey—which received more than 63,000 responses in 2007 and 
more than 65,000 responses in 2011–2012. Id. 
139. Id. at 1; see also Chris Plauché Johnson & Scott M. Myers, Identification 
and Evaluation of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 120 
Pediatrics 1183, 1198–99 (2007) (discussing current screening 
protocols).  
140. Blumberg, supra note 131, at 1; see also Johnson & Myers, supra note 
139, at 1202 (“Older children who first present with symptoms of AS after 
school entry often are first recognized and evaluated by the school 
district’s educational diagnostic team.”). 
141. Blumberg, supra note 131, at 1–2; Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101–476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990).  
142. Blumberg, supra note 131, at 5. 
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mild. Changes in the ascertainment of ASD could occur because 
of changes in ASD awareness among parents or health care 
professionals, increased access to diagnostic services, changes in 
how screening tests or diagnostic criteria are used, or increased 
special education placements in the community.144 
As a result, some would suggest that the rise in the number of ASD 
diagnoses does not reflect an increase in the number of ASD cases. One 
blogger noted that activist organizations might try to scare people by 
declaring an “epidemic” but clarified that “the numbers of people born 
with autism aren’t necessarily increasing dramatically. It’s just that 
we’re getting better and better at counting them.”145 
However, for the SSI and Medicaid programs, the distinction does 
not matter. Once a child is diagnosed with ASD, his or her family can 
apply for benefits. The increasing diagnosis rate will result in more 
government aid expenditures even without an increase in the actual 
rate of the disorder. Families with children who have ASD spend an 
average of $60,000 a year on care.146 Many of these families will be 
forced to apply for aid. Because the children meet the disability criteria 
but are still likely to live longer thanks to advances in medicine and 
technology, they may be able to collect Medicaid disbursements over 
their entire lifespans. Medicaid and other government assistance 
programs will struggle to keep up with the increased demand, but third-
party special needs trusts could be a highly effective tool in balancing 
the cost between the government and families of the disabled children. 
IV. Solution 
Third-party trusts cannot continue to function if their definition as 
either a supplemental or support trust is left up to the interpretation 
of trust language by state courts. They differ from self-settled and 
pooled trusts in several significant ways that only make the need for a 
bright-line rule even more imperative. They are created to provide a 
higher quality of life using funds that never belonged to the beneficiary, 
not to shield funds that the beneficiary received from personal injury 
or medical malpractice settlements. They can be set up inter vivos to 
provide for the disabled child while his or her parents are still alive. 
They are more likely to involve a beneficiary who is incapable of 
demanding distributions from the trust, even if that would not lead to 
ineligibility for SSI and Medicaid. These individuals have lived and will 
continue to live with disabilities throughout their entire lives, and they  
143. Id. 
144. Emily Willingham, Autism Prevalence Is Now at 1 in 50 Children, 
Forbes (Mar. 20, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/Emily 
willingham/2013/03/20/autism-prevalence-is-now-at-1-in-50-children (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
145. Fact Sheet, supra note 133. 
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may be to varying degrees dependent on their families and the 
government for support.  
Unlike self-settled trusts, for which the family may make no 
expenditure for the care of a disabled individual, the funds in 
third-party trusts come entirely from the family. Consequently, the 
creation and effective use of third-party special needs trusts tend to 
have more of an impact on the family of the disabled individual than 
other types of trusts. Because these differences are widely overlooked 
by SSI, Medicaid, and the UTC, families with permanently disabled 
children have to undertake the complicated task of creating trusts that 
even their attorneys may not understand, even though they are not 
usually capable of committing the kind of abuse that regulations 
creating the complications are meant to prevent. One-time changes to 
the SSI and Medicaid regulations could fix this problem and remove 
the burden from thousands of families.  
The government should design a way for parents of disabled 
children to supplement Medicaid and other basic support through third-
party special needs trusts without losing their benefits. In order to offset 
the inescapable increase in demand for government aid, the new system 
should reduce the amount of aid given based on the level of support 
parents or other benefactors are willing and able to provide, both during 
their lives and after their deaths through the trust. However, a revised 
system  needs to realistically rebalance the amount of aid withdrawn 
versus the assets available. A mere $2,000 in assets should not be 
enough to completely disqualify a disabled beneficiary from receiving 
his government aid. While $2,000 may be enough to provide a disabled 
individual with extra care, it is nowhere near sufficient to cover his or 
her medical, housing, and other basic costs for even a single month. 
The best way to implement this change would be to give 
supplemental third-party special needs trusts their own exception in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4), but an exception that is less limited than the 
exceptions for self-settled and pooled trusts. The exception would not 
need to allow the beneficiary to have access to the funds. In fact, many 
disabled beneficiaries of third-party special needs trusts lack the 
capacity to use the assets themselves. Instead, it should do away with 
the reliance on court interpretations of third-party special needs trusts 
by giving clear criteria for when a trust is supplemental. The criteria 
could be laid out as follows: when a trust (1) is established by a parent, 
grandparent, or legal guardian of a disabled person who qualifies for 
Medicaid; (2) is funded by the parents, grandparent, or legal guardian; 
and (3) states an intent to supplement, not supplant, government aid, 
it is presumed to be a supplementary trust that cannot disqualify the 
beneficiary from need-based governmental programs.147  
 
146. Going a bit further, Joseph A. Rosenberg suggests that a presumption 
should be created that “[a]bsent a clear expression of intent that the trust 
should be used to replace government benefits, the trust should not be 
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The more lenient distribution standards would allow family 
members and the trust to make some contributions that overlap with 
SSI and Medicaid without fear of losing benefits. The exception would 
also need to include a way to calculate how much aid to withhold based 
on how much money the trust distributed. For instance, if the trust is 
routinely able to give the beneficiary more each month than he would 
receive from Medicaid and SSI, the government aid provided should be 
greatly reduced. But if the trust can usually only give 10 percent of 
what the government provides, the beneficiary’s aid should not be 
reduced at all. Because the purposes of the two sources differ, the 
reduction in benefits should never match the trust distributions dollar 
for dollar. One provides necessities, while the other offers comforts. For 
instance, if the trust makes a large expenditure to renovate the 
beneficiary’s house for accessibility, it should not result in a loss of 
medical benefits equal to the cost of the renovations. 
Proponents of the Medicaid program may argue that this new 
exception would drain its already-stretched funds, but that argument 
is flawed. Generally, any change that adds new recipients to the 
program would cost it money; however, the supplemental third-party 
special needs trust exception would not add new recipients. People who 
use these trusts have already found a way to collect the full amount of 
their government aid through loopholes in the Medicaid regulations, 
albeit by sacrificing many legal protections. Instead of costing Medicaid 
more, the trust expenditures sanctioned by the new exception would 
actually let Medicaid decrease the amount given to some recipients. 
They would also restore the rights of the trust beneficiaries, who would 
no longer have to rely on the absolute discretion of trustees and court 
inquiries into the subjective nature of the grantor’s intent. 
Conclusion  
It is never easy to take the first steps down the long road toward 
amending regulations, but in the case of third-party special needs 
trusts, the destination is worth it. Parents or guardians of special needs 
children would be relieved of a major mental and emotional burden if 
they had a reliable means of securing their children’s long-term well-
being. The Medicaid and Social Security programs would no longer be 
caught in a tug-of-war between assisting the beneficiaries of third-party 
special needs trusts and accusing them of cheating the system. 
Attorneys and the courts would have fewer complex and time-
 
considered an available asset for purposes of eligibility for government 
benefits.” Rosenberg, supra note 76, at 149. I believe this might make it 
too easy for trusts to make distributions for support (e.g., buying a house) 
under the guise of being a supplemental trust. Some court interpretation 
will always be necessary, and the distribution types and amounts are the 
most difficult element to clearly label either support or supplement.  
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consuming cases on their hands, and the interests of justice, social 
welfare, and economy would be served.  
The increasing rate of ASD diagnoses creates additional legal 
concerns across the board. While this Note focuses only on estate 
planning aspects of special needs care, undoubtedly changes are needed 
in the medical, education, labor, housing, and civil rights fields to cope 
with a rising number of disabled individuals. Disability issues are often 
ignored by legislators—pushed to the side to make way for topics 
deemed more pressing. But the problems will not simply disappear. 
Now more than ever, thanks to medical and social innovations, disabled 
children have the opportunity to grow up in an environment that strives 
to understand their needs and unlock their potential. The law needs to 
catch up.  
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